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Monsignor McDonald, your own rector, made a plea of great importance at the Catholic University's June commencement, this year. He called for a national foundation based on the National Science Foundation, which would provide aid to outstanding young men and women who chose the arts and humanities as their field of graduate research; similar financial support as is today given to those who dedicate themselves to research in the sciences. I welcome the thoughtful suggestion of the rector of the Catholic University of America. It is a most constructive suggestion, worthy of every consideration.

The battle for the future will be, as has been said before, a battle for men's minds. To the nation with the greatest understanding of the truth—of the whole truth—of the truth in science and the truth in culture, to this nation belongs tomorrow. And today's struggle is to prepare the minds of our young men and women with a grasp of knowledge and understanding which is balanced enough to meet the challenges of an evolving science without losing its roots in a culture that still appreciates the value of the human person. I commend the Catholic University of America for its never-flagging dedication to this ideal. It captures my imagination, and I commend highly your right reverend rector for advancing these constructive proposals.

We are living in an important and trying period of the world's history. As you and I are present this evening, history is being made. Despite the cooing voice of peaceful coexistence, the forces of evil are bent on world domination.

While we must be powerful militarily, we must also be strong spiritually; all persons everywhere who believe in God and His law. For deep faith is the affirmative strength that could well be the difference between victory and defeat.

One of the great events of history is taking place now in Rome—instituted by Pope John and followed and emphasized in his own right by Pope Paul—the Ecumenical Council.

This is not only a great event in the history of the Catholic Church, and more broadly, of religion, but it is one of the historic events of mankind. For from it will flow great beneficial results.

It is evident to everyone that the Ecumenical Council is affirmative and positive. The growth of the ecumenical spirit throughout the world has already strongly evidenced itself. The religious understanding and spirit is stronger today than it has been for generations, and that understanding and spirit will grow stronger in generations that lie ahead.

While military power is necessary as a deterrent to Communist aggression, the ecumenical spirit everywhere is necessary for a future world of peace. For in a sense, military strength is negative—responding to the law of self-preservation—to deter, and in case of attack and war, to win and survive. In the world of today it is absolutely necessary. And our country has great military strength and power. But it is the word of God in the minds of men and women that is our real strength, our affirmative strength, animating their thoughts and actions, and looking forward with faith and confidence to a world of peace.

As we project our minds into the foreseeable future the results that will flow from the work of the Ecumenical Council, makes it one of the most notable events of world history.

As Cardinal Cushing recently and so well said, "The present Ecumenical Council will accept the challenge of those who contend that we are on the threshold of an atheistic era."

It is in the spirit of James Cardinal Gibbons, who in America many years ago, preached and practiced the ecumenical spirit, that I accept this year's award of the Cardinal Gibbons Medal.

#### THE UNITED STATES AND RECENT EVENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

The SPEAKER. Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. ZABLOCKI] is recognized for 30 minutes.

(Mr. ZABLOCKI asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Speaker, it has been with deep concern and sorrow that I have viewed the events of the past few days in South Vietnam. I have been concerned about the ruthless way in which the Diem government was deposed and grieved at the assassination of President Diem himself.

Just 4 weeks ago today seven other Members of this body and I sat in the President's palace in Saigon, exchanging views with President Diem.

At that time we advised Diem of the anxiety evident in the United States and elsewhere in the free world over the domestic political problems which had plagued his administration. We emphasized the fear that these difficulties might adversely affect the military campaign against the Vietcong if they continued.

We cautioned him that political unrest in the form of dissident groups, vocal opponents at home and abroad, uprisings by students, dissatisfaction among the intelligentsia and antagonism from Buddhists would continue to harass his government unless reforms were made soon.

At that time President Diem promised that reforms would be made, that civil liberties would be restored to his people as soon as hostilities with the Vietcong had subsided. Of course, he had made such promises before and nothing had been done. I am satisfied, however, that Diem meant what he said. He impressed us as a dedicated nationalist, sincere, incorruptible, and determined to defeat the Communist Vietcong.

From our conversation, it was evident that President Diem and his brother, Nhu, were conscious of the possibility of a coup. There had been, it should be remembered, five previous unsuccessful attempts to oust the Diem regime. But Diem indicated no fear of his political opponents.

For whatever his adversaries might say about him, they cannot deny the honesty, the courage, or ability of Ngo Dinh Diem.

A fervent champion of Vietnamese nationalism, Diem returned in 1954 from 4 years of exile to lead the Government of South Vietnam, a country which at that time had no national feeling or identity.

Almost singlehandedly, with few resources at his command, Diem created a nation-state of Vietnam and solidified the rule of his government. To do this he was forced to crush the opposition of dissident sects, subdue pirate bands

roving the delta and coastal regions, and began the campaign to recapture the countryside from the Communist guerrillas. At the same time he effectively accomplished the absorbing of hundreds of thousands of refugees from North Vietnam who had streamed into South Vietnam at the end of the French-China war.

It is safe to say that had there been no Diem in South Vietnam, the situation there would have been even more chaotic than it has been, and the Communist Vietcong would be in a stronger position than they are today.

Yet we have heard from many individuals that the war against the Vietcong could not be won with Diem. Our study mission found that the war against the Vietcong was being won. The Vietnamese, we reported, are determined to maintain their independence and their forces have been fighting well.

However, it cannot be denied that the reputation as a national leader and hero which Diem earned by his early actions as Vietnam's President in recent months, had fallen because of the repressive measures which had been taken against opponents of his regime. His popularity, particularly in the large cities, had been dissipated by a series of government actions against the people attributed largely to his brother, Nhu and Mdm. Nhu.

As a result of these actions U.S. economic and military assistance was curtailed.

In part, this withholding of assistance was justified. Particularly aid which went to the regime's "special forces" who misused U.S. assistance in their raids on Buddhist pagodas.

But there can be little doubt that this curtailment of aid also heartened Diem's opponents and helped trigger the coup. It was a signal to the military leaders of Vietnam that the United States would support the overthrow of the Diem regime.

Further, there will be some who will say that the United States openly encouraged the coup.

Whatever the case, Mr. Speaker, the military junta which now rules Vietnam has not shown itself to be any less, the less or any less autocratic than the former regime. One of its first acts was the reprehensible slaying of President Diem.

For those of us reared in the Judeo-Christian tradition and schooled in Anglo-Saxon law, this act of assassination is repulsive. It is made even more horrible by the attempt to make the killing seem a suicide. Even in military action, killing those who surrender is a massacre.

The State Department has officially deplored the assassination of Diem while disclaiming any prior knowledge of the plot to overthrow him. Yet subsequently we have learned that members of the American press corp in Saigon were aware that a coup was imminent.

Can we believe then that the State Department did not know that a coup

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was likely? Were steps taken to warn President Diem of pending danger?

And what of the CIA? Did its agents in Vietnam know of the coup? Did, in fact, the CIA play a part in it? These questions remain to be answered.

But one thing is clear. If officials of the U.S. Government knew of the coup, and failed to exert every possible pressure to gain assurances of safe conduct out of the country for President Diem, then the shadow of blame falls on our Nation. Mr. Speaker, only time will tell what really happened in Vietnam. I hope the authorities will soon advise the Congress and our Nation so that faith can be kept in our executive departments.

What has happened in Vietnam must cause troubled thoughts for the leaders of other nations allied with the United States in the fight against world Communist aggression, in southeast Asia, in Europe, and most particularly in Latin America.

Further, Mr. Speaker, it is my belief that before the United States recognizes the junta in Vietnam as being the legitimate government in that country, we should receive some definite commitments from its leaders. We have learned hard lessons in other parts of the world when a military junta supplanted civilian rule.

Some formula should be agreed upon to return control of Vietnam to civilian rule as soon as possible. Further, similar requirements such as we are awaiting in the Dominican Republic and Honduras are in order. Finally, we should insist on reforms such as requested of the prior regime in Vietnam.

Mr. Speaker, it is vital that we continue our efforts to defeat the Vietcong. We should continue to cooperate with the ruling junta in Vietnam in pressing the war against the Vietcong.

However, let us closely examine the request of the junta, as reported in the press, for double our present level of assistance—both economic and military.

According to some individuals Diem was the main stumbling block in the way of winning the war against the Vietcong. Diem is gone now, cruelly slain. Why then, now that the obstacle is gone, is substantially increased assistance necessary?

As a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee, I want to serve notice now that Congress will be taking a close and careful look at any forthcoming requests for massive increased aid to Vietnam. Further, the occurrences in Vietnam and elsewhere indicate the reevaluation, reassessment, and redirection of present policies concerning assistance to foreign nations is necessary.

Mr. LAIRD. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ZABLOCKI. I am delighted to yield.

Mr. LAIRD. Mr. Speaker, I know of the long interest of the gentleman from Wisconsin in the problems of Vietnam and the conduct of the United States in its efforts to stop communism in that section of the world. I think that the report that the gentleman has made today is indeed a very fine report. I would

like to ask him one question, and that is, Does not the gentleman believe that there were commitments made by the United States, to the military junta that took over in Vietnam prior to the time of the rioting and the takeover by the junta?

Mr. ZABLOCKI. The gentleman knows the answer to that question far better than I. As a member of the Committee on Appropriations, the gentleman is deeply interested in the defeat of the Communist menace throughout the world. He knows the answer.

Mr. LAIRD. I could not tell from the gentleman's remarks what he thought as chairman of the Investigating Committee of the Committee on Foreign Affairs. I was trying to get his best judgment.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. My best judgment, I might say to the gentleman, is that there must have been some encouragement.

Mr. LAIRD. I thank the gentleman. Mr. CRAMER. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ZABLOCKI. I am glad to yield.

Mr. CRAMER. Mr. Speaker, I was very much interested in the gentleman's observation with regard to military coups. The gentleman very rightly pointed out that the cases of Honduras and the Dominican Republic are situations of two military coups. I understand the gentleman's position is that there should be considerable reservation about recognition of this military junta in South Vietnam unless adequate assurances are given with regard to elections, and other matters which the gentleman mentioned. According to the press the State Department is ready, willing, and anxious to give immediate recognition to the junta there, in South Vietnam, but just the last weekend they announced their intentions to withdraw all semblance of recognition, even practically all of the military missions from the Dominican Republic and from Honduras. Does not the gentleman feel that that position of the administration is slightly inconsistent?

Mr. ZABLOCKI. I definitely agree that there is an inconsistency. In my opinion the same formula, similar requirements, as I said earlier, should be followed in both instances. I believe that agreements and commitments on the part of the military junta in Vietnam must be had now, before recognition, so that we may be more certain of the return of a civilian government to Vietnam.

I agree with the gentleman. Basically, there are no differences in the situation in Vietnam.

Mr. CRAMER. If the gentleman will yield further, the gentleman agrees that the principle is the same, does he not?

Mr. ZABLOCKI. I agree.

Mr. CRAMER. Will the gentleman yield further?

Mr. ZABLOCKI. I would be glad to yield further to the gentleman from Florida.

Mr. CRAMER. I understand that there are obviously communications going on at the present time between the Vietnam junta and this Government re-

lating to what the junta's intention is in the future; is that not correct?

Mr. ZABLOCKI. That is correct.

Mr. CRAMER. I have been disturbed by the fact, and I understand it is a fact, because I was informed by the ambassador to the OAS from the Dominican Republic, Ambassador Bonilla, just last week, that he cannot get in to see anybody in the State Department to discuss pledges that the triumvirate ruling government in the Dominican Republic is willing to give to the United States relating to elections as soon as possible and relating to assurances such as concerning the return to constitutional government in the Dominican Republic.

I am sure the gentleman is fully aware that a few days after the military junta took over, the government was turned over to the civilian triumvirate which is now governing it and the country is now governed by the military.

The gentleman is familiar with the fact that the military forces are no longer patrolling the streets, imposing martial law, and that there is a substantial degree of freedom even now in the Dominican Republic. Yet the U.S. Government will not even talk to Bonilla in this country nor are they willing to send an official or unofficial emissary to discuss with the triumvirate in the Dominican Republic what their plans are or what assurances they are willing to give.

Does not the gentleman from Wisconsin feel that is totally inconsistent? How are we going to help settle the very serious, critical, and explosive situation in the Dominican Republic? We have specifically made recommendations and made certain things in this other crisis in South Vietnam. Can the gentleman understand why our Government will not even set up communications between the United States and the Dominican Republic?

Mr. ZABLOCKI. I will say to the gentleman from Florida that I am unable to reply to the question which he is asking. I agree that the transitional governments in the Dominican Republic and Honduras should be given at least an opportunity to present their case. The issues are similar. That is why in the conclusion of my prepared statement I stated that there should be a reevaluation, reassessment, and a reevaluation of our military and economic assistance, not only in the case of Vietnam and the Dominican Republic, but in other areas.

Mr. CRAMER. Will the gentleman yield for one additional question?

Mr. ZABLOCKI. I yield to the gentleman from Florida.

Mr. CRAMER. I know you are familiar with the fact that for some time I have been concerned over the fact that in Latin America the Communists are continuing to infiltrate and gain ever stronger positions in many countries. In many of the Latin American countries our Alliance for Progress program and foreign aid program efforts apparently are not successfully directed toward preventing Communist growth and the taking over of some of these countries by the Communists.